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Geographical Stratification and the Role of the State in Access to Higher 
Education in Contemporary China 
 
Ye Liu 
 
Abstract 
 
This article extends the geopolitical theory on geographical stratification to 
understand the persistent inequality in access to higher education in contemporary 
China. Drawing on empirical evidence on the geographical distribution of institutions, 
and differentiated admissions and recruitment processes, I examine how political and 
institutional arrangements shaped opportunity structures in access to higher education 
for students from different geographical origins. I conclude that the state’s 
decentralized governance gave the eastern area more power and advantages while the 
students from the poor western and central regions suffered a lack of opportunities in 
achieving upward social mobility through higher education. 
 
Key words: China, higher education, geographical stratification, the Gaokao, cut-off 
points, the quota policy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
China’s rapid rise over the past two decades has significance beyond the economy and 
geopolitics. As an emerging economic giant it is also becoming an increasingly 
important geo-political and cultural force in the world (Jacques, 2012). Many 
questions remain about whether it can sustain its extraordinary developmental 
momentum (Hutton, 2007) but if this is to be the ‘Asian Century’ (Arrighi, 2007) 
global interest in China’s cultural traditions and institutions will undoubtedly 
increase. Already its higher education system is attracting widespread interest for its 
massive output of science and technology graduates (Brown et al. 2011). How did 
China progress from the chaotic Cultural Revolution period, when education 
experienced its darkest hour, to the current situation, when China’s output of skills 
and talent presents a growing challenge to the West? What has been the role of 
education in China’s economic ascent and in the re-shaping of the social structure? 
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And how does education mediate the growing internal contradictions in China, not 
least those associated with increasing the level of inequality. To date there has been 
only limited empirical research on these questions, and we know very little about the 
changing role of education in shaping life chances in different regions. The latter 
constitutes the main focus of this research which aims to provide an in-depth 
investigation of education opportunities by students from different geographical 
origins in contemporary China.  
      Geographical stratification in developing contexts has been under-researched and 
under-theorised in the studies of education and development and the sociology of 
education. Two lines of inquiry have shaped the debate on the relation between 
education and geographical stratification. One line of these focuses on changes in 
economic conditions since the 1970s and their implications for educational provision 
and outcomes for people from different geographical origins. Modernization theory 
argues that geographical stratification is linked to the processes of economic 
modernization and development (Treiman, 1970; Forsythe et al., 2000). Most 
developing contexts are characterised by sharp regional economic disparities and the 
uneven distribution of social infrastructures. In education, schooling systems are often 
better funded in urban or affluent regions than in rural or poor areas (Hannum and 
Wang, 2006). The uneven distribution of educational resources and infrastructures has 
had direct implications on educational attainment. Evidence from African countries, 
including Ghana and Mali, and from Brazil demonstrates dramatic regional 
differences in educational attainment, as measured by trends in attendance and 
completion rates since the expansion of educational opportunities (Rigotti and 
Fletcher, 2001; ORC/Macro, 2000). 
       A second type of research highlights the changes in politics and governance in 
education and the implications of these changes for geographical inequality. 
Literature in development studies argues that widening geographical inequality has 
been related to decentralised governance or devolution practices in economic and 
social policies (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2004). Devolved fiscal policy in the public 
sector is argued to be the primary contributing factor to differentiated educational 
outcomes among regions. Decentralised funding policy in education delegates 
funding responsibilities for education to the regional or local levels; hence, initially 
developed areas have better financial capacity in educational provision than poor 
areas which will inevitably lead to greater regional differences. Evidence from China 
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(Yao and Zhang, 2001), Brazil (Azzioni, 2001), the USA (Bernat, 2001) and some 
European countries (Loughlin, 2001; Petrakos, 2001) suggests that decentralised 
systems of governance have favoured rich regions in terms of resources, capacities 
and competitiveness and has disadvantaged poor areas, thus increasing geographical 
inequality. 
       These studies focus primarily on the geographical distribution of educational 
resources, infrastructures and funding, and the implications of this for educational 
attainment and skills outcomes. However, they do not provide a detailed account of 
the processes through which geographical unevenness reproduces inequality of 
opportunity. Nor do they explore the institutional arrangements which underpin the 
persistent patterns whereby rich regions continue to improve in educational 
attainment while poor regions stagnate or decline. Furthermore, these studies often 
contribute little to the theorization of geography as an indicator of social stratification 
and how it interplays with other indicators such as class, ethnicity and gender, 
particularly in developing economies.  
       This article provides new evidence on geographical stratification in access to 
higher education in contemporary China. China’s tremendous rise as an economic 
power has exacerbated inequality between different regions. Geographical 
stratification not only exists between rural and urban areas; but it is also evident in 
large regional differences. The state played an important role in producing this uneven 
pattern of economic development with its gradualist strategy of initiating market 
reforms first in the eastern and coastal areas, and only later extending them to the rest 
of China (Arrighi, 2007). This article seeks to shed light on how this geographical 
stratification impacts on the educational opportunity structures in China today and, in 
particular, how political and institutional arrangements have exacerbated geographical 
stratification in access to higher education.  
       The analysis uses theories of geographical stratification drawn from political 
economy to explain the persistence of regional inequality during China’s transition to 
a market economy since the 1970s and to show how state policy has reproduced this 
geographical stratification in access to higher education, including in all types of post 
compulsory institutions in the China Statistical Yearbook, which are equivalent to the 
ISCED 4, 5 and 6. Specifically, it examines the impact of a set of institutional 
arrangements – including those for the national entrance examinations (the Gaokao) 
and the decentralized admissions and recruitment planning procedures - on shaping 
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the opportunity structure. By tracing the patterns of educational progression by 
selected birth cohorts, I demonstrate how these institutional arrangements affected the 
chances of students from different geographical origins to get access to higher 
education, and particularly to the elite universities. I then use the evidence on the 
uneven distribution of higher education institutions and types of universities, the 
progression rates to higher education and differentiated admission and recruitment 
criteria across provinces to argue that political decentralisation policies in higher 
education result in a deep-seated contradiction between the state’s national 
development strategy and the objective of reducing regional disparities. 
 
2. Theoretical standpoints on geographical stratification  
Geographical stratification has been an enduring interest in political economy. 
Political economists and economic geographers highlight the geographical dimension 
as an important aspect of stratification in capitalist economies (Harvey, 2011; Massey, 
1987, 2005; Ohnmacht et al., 2009). Geographical stratification is explained by the 
interplay of regional differentiation and economic and political forces. Geographical 
inequality is understood as a consequence of differentiated proximity to natural 
resources, labour and consumer markets (Harvey, 2011; Smith, 1994). It is also 
affected by the availability of infrastructures, including the transport and 
communication systems (Harvey, 2011). Capitalist production in market economies 
demands geographical mobility (Lindgren and Lundahl, 2010; Urry, 2007) not only at 
the national level but also in the global market (Cresswell, 2006; Baumawn, 1998). 
Therefore, the capacity of achieving geographical mobility at the national and 
international level is regarded as a stratifying factor alongside income, wealth, status, 
occupation, and social capital in the increasingly globalized world (Ohnmatht et al., 
2009). 
       Moreover, geographical stratification is affected by institutional and 
administrative arrangements in relation to economic production, social relations, 
technological forms and localised life styles at the regional level (Morrow, 2006). The 
state plays an important role in these institutional and administrative arrangements, 
constantly adjusting its mode of governance at the national and regional level to 
guarantee the mobility of capital and to favour the conditions that yield economic 
growth and enhanced living standards (Harvey, 2011). Geographical stratification is 
thus shaped by inter-related economic and political factors, and has effects on 
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opportunity structures. Education opportunities, in particular with higher education, 
are essential to understanding social mobility and stratification (Shavit et al., 2007). 
Access to higher education opportunities is shaped by stratifiers such as social class, 
gender and ethnicity (for example, Mountford-Zimdars et al. 2013; Boliver 2015). 
Geographical origin is also highlighted as an important stratifying dimension in 
access to the opportunity structure.  
       There are many examples outside China of geographical inequality in access to 
higher education. A study by Metcalfe (2009), for instance, shows how the 
geographical distribution of higher education institutions reinforces regional 
inequality in British Columbia in Canada. Research on the USA shows persistent 
inequality in access to a selective public flagship university by students from different 
geo-spatial origins (Turner and Pusser, 2004). Similar research also shows that 
students from several cities have strong advantages in access to the University of 
California leading to an unequal pattern of participation by geographical origins 
(Martin et al., 2003). A case study in Sweden concludes that geographical 
stratification affects students’ aspirations in higher education and careers, and that 
students from poor regions are least likely to achieve upward social mobility 
(Lindgren and Lundahl, 2010). These studies demonstrate that geographical origin is 
an important factor to understanding unequal access to higher education. Moreover, 
institutional arrangements such as the geographical distribution of universities also 
shape education opportunities differently for those from different geographical 
origins. The next section will extend these theoretical standpoints to the context of 
contemporary China and investigate access to higher education by students from 
different geographical origins. 
 
3. Geographical stratification, economic development, social mobility and the 
state in China 
China has several attractive attributes as a case through which to examine the 
dynamics of geographical differences, economic forces and political arrangements.   
First, China has a long history of uneven regional distribution of resources and 
population due to its vast territory and special geographical features (Harvey, 2005). 
The main regions in China can be characterised as eastern coastal, central and western 
areas, as detailed in Table 1. Eastern and coastal regions include three municipal cities 
- Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin
1
- as well as coastal provinces such as Zhejiang, 
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Shandong and Guangdong. The geographical advantages of eastern coastal areas 
include closer proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan, better connections with 
international transport and trade, and close ties with the overseas Chinese capital and 
entrepreneurial talents (Walker and Buck, 2007).  Central areas feature those 
primarily agricultural provinces from north to south such as Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, 
Henan and Anhui. Western regions include those provinces with large minority 
populations such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia and Sichuan.   
 
Table 1: Three regions and provincial units in China 
Region Provinces 
Eastern coastal Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangxi, Guangdong, Hainan 
Central interior Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, 
Jiangxi, Hunan 
Western  Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Tibet, Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan 
 
       Second, China’s particular geopolitical circumstances in the 1980s – a time when 
most of the Communist bloc was collapsing – encouraged  the state’s development 
strategy of cautious gradualism (Arrighi, 2007). Compared to the Eastern European 
countries and Russia which followed the shock therapy
2
 masterminded by IMF 
(International Monetary Fund) and underwent a catastrophic transition, China 
developed a gradualist strategy of Reform and Opening-up.  This introduced the 
market economy, foreign trade investment and structural reforms exclusively in 
eastern and coastal areas in the 1980s, only later extending this to the central and 
western area in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Gao and Tong, 2008). Specific 
institutional arrangements were followed to implement this gradual strategy, 
including establishing the ‘Special Economic Zones’ and the ‘East Coast-First’ policy 
(Rozelle, 1996). Several south-eastern provinces were chosen as pilot sites for more 
extensive market transition from the late 1970s to the 1980s. By the 1990s, the state 
had invested substantially in the development of the key cities, such as Shanghai and 
Tianjin on the eastern coast (Vermeer, 2004).  
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       In parallel with these policy measures was the changing role of state governance. 
The state decentralized legislative power, as well as tax and fiscal responsibilities, to 
local administrations and governments (Chan and Wang, 2008). Controlled 
decentralization resulted in the rapid economic growth of a market economy in the 
eastern coast. In the meanwhile, central and western regions lagged behind and 
stagnated. These regions were disadvantaged by their geographical locations, lack of 
efficient transport and infrastructures, and by unfavourable political and institutional 
arrangements (Lu and Deng, 2011). As Lu and Deng explain, the eastern coastal 
region benefitted from the preferential policies and its economy grew rapidly, which 
widened the gap between the east and the hinterland and intensified regional conflicts 
(Lu and Deng, 2011: 2). Geographical stratification was therefore an inevitable 
consequence of the state’s development strategy and decentralisation policy which 
also had direct implications on educational resources and infrastructures.  
      Geographical disparity was highlighted as the key ‘stratifier’ in educational 
opportunities and provision (Hannum and Wang, 2006: 258). Research has provided 
evidence on substantial regional differences in educational provision, resources and 
funding (Tsang, 2000; Piazza and Liang, 1998). More specifically, some studies have 
linked the decentralisation policies such as the devolution of school funding from the 
central to the local government to growing disparities in educational outcomes, 
including the enrolment rates, completion rates and progression rates from primary to 
secondary level between western and eastern provinces between 1980s and early 
2000s (Park et al., 2003; Zhang and Kanbur, 2005; Tsang, 2000; Wong, 2002). Park 
et al. demonstrated that the ratio of primary education expenditure per student 
between Shanghai and poorest provinces doubled between the 1990s and 2000s (Park 
et al., 2003).  
       Unlike schooling in China, where student attendance is mainly localised, higher 
education allows scope for students from different geographical origins to apply to 
institutions outside their geographical area. However, this does not necessarily lead to 
greater equality of opportunity due to the mechanisms that govern access to 
universities. Access rather than choices in higher education will be the main focus of 
this article. The rationale for this particular focus is to highlight decentralised 
admission and recruitment policies associated with the centralised entrance 
examination and the impact on the opportunities for students from different 
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geographical origins. The following section moves on to investigate geographical 
patterns in participation in higher education in contemporary China. 
 
4. Higher education expansion and institutional arrangements in shaping the 
opportunity structure of geographical origins 
Higher education has expanded at a rapid rate in China since the early 1990s. The 
number of students rose from 1.58 million in 1990 to more than 23 million in 2006, 
the latter representing 21 per cent of the 20-24 ago cohort, (NSBC, 2007). This 
expansion provided more opportunities for students to apply to universities in regions 
beyond their own locality. The fee-charging introduced in almost all types of 
institution
3
 in 1997 ended the state-funded era and marked the beginning of a 
marketized model of higher education. This retreat from central government 
responsibility for higher education, known as the binggui
4
 policy, resulted in an 
increase in the number of provincial higher education institutions. The total number 
increased by 42 per cent between 2000 and 2005 (NBSC, 2001, 2006). Most of the 
growth in universities in this period occurred in the provinces (NBSC, 2001, 2006). 
The total number increased another 22 per cent between 2005 and 2009 (NBSC, 
2010). Since the state had delegated the majority of financial responsibilities in higher 
education to individual families, local governments and institutions, it could then 
concentrate its funding on selected universities. From 1998 it focused on developing 
world-class universities to promote the quality and reputation of Chinese higher 
education institutions worldwide.
5
 
      Figure 1 illustrates the scale of the expansion of higher education by comparing 
the progression rates
6
 at various selection points of the educational career of selected 
birth cohorts. The birth cohorts selected for comparison are the 1972 to 1974 birth 
cohort, the 1977 to 1979 birth cohort, the 1980 to 1982 birth cohort, the 1985 to 1987 
birth cohort and the 1990 to 1992 birth cohort. The reason for choosing these cohorts 
is to draw a parallel between the life course of these birth cohorts and the key changes 
of state policy in higher education. The transition points of these birth cohorts from 
senior secondary schooling to higher education were at around 1990, 1995, 1998, 
2005 and 2009. The progression of their educational careers occurred in parallel with 
the beginning of reforms in higher education (1990), the introduction of the binggui 
policy (1995), the world-class university project  (1998) and the growth of institutions 
at the provincial level (since the 2000s). The years of 1996, 1999, 2005 and 2009 are 
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selected since they represent important stages in the reform of higher education. The 
binggui was introduced in 1995 and was gradually adopted throughout all provinces 
and different types of universities by the late 1990s and the early 2000s. A direct 
effect of the binggui policy was an increase in the number of students enrolled in 
higher education. The data on the year of 1996 were used as the baseline to illustrate 
the scale of the recruitment expansion thereafter. The world-class university project 
was initiated in 1998 and 40 universities were awarded world-class university status 
in 1999 with several more universities receiving the designation in 2005.  
       Figure 1 shows that the progression rates for the first two birth cohorts were very 
low – at around 2 per cent and 4 per cent. Around 8 per cent of the 1980-1982 birth 
cohort was enrolled in four-year higher education institutions after the binggui policy 
was introduced. There was a significant increase in the progression rate for the 1985-
1987 cohort, rising to 21 per cent. This was at around 2003-2005 when the binggui 
policy was more comprehensively adopted by all types of institutions. From around 
2005 to 2010, there was a dramatic rise in the progression rate -31 per cent of the 
1990-1992 cohort now progressed into higher education, the figure representing a 
fourfold increase on the progression rate for the cohort ten years older.  
 
Figure 1: The progression rates at various points of educational career of selected 
cohorts 
 
Source: the China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC 1996, 1999, 2001, 2006, 2009). 
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Note: The progression rate at each transition point is calculated by comparing the data 
on new recruitment to junior secondary schooling, senior secondary schooling and 
higher education to the data on the number of graduates at the preceding educational 
level. 
        
       The expansion of higher education thus massively increased opportunities for 
participation overall. However, it remains to be explained how students from different 
geographical origins were affected by the expansion. We therefore need to examine 
key institutional arrangements in the admission and recruitment system to understand 
geographical differences in access to higher education. In 1977, after the end of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the National Entrance Examination (the Gaokao) 
was re-introduced to replace political screening (for Party membership and the loyalty 
to the Regime) as the main form of selection and to highlight the growing importance 
of meritocratic criteria in a country which was undergoing an historical transition to a 
market economy.
7
 The Gaokao is a standardised examination system at the national 
level, except in some developed areas, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Hainan that 
have adopted local Gaokao systems. However, the extent to which the Gaokao 
functions as an effective and fair selection system for students from different 
geographical origins remains unexplored. Particularly with the introduction of 
decentralised admission and recruitment policy to higher education, the state’s 
changing governance has significant implications on the opportunity structure for 
students from different geographical origins in access to higher education.  
       The decentralisation of higher education selection in China has involved two 
policy measures, the differentiated selection (cut-off points) and the quota policy. The 
Gaokao is a national examination with national standards for assessment, but 
differentiated admission and recruitment policy involves regions specifying different 
standards for entry to university. The differentiated selection system involves each 
province setting a minimal level of points (or ‘cut-off’ points) for entry to different 
types of universities within the province. Cut-off points
8
 are determined by provincial 
or local ministries of education each year, after the Gaokao, based on distribution of 
scores in that year of students in that area. Moreover, each institution then adjusts its 
own cut-off points against the provincial guideline for entry to different fields of 
study. In addition to this differentiation in entry requirements by regions, China’s 
universities also operate a quota policy, which adjusts entry requirements depending 
on the place of origin of applicant, normally giving advantages to local students.      
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       This quota policy is supposedly an instrument for recruitment planning used by 
individual universities which is designed to reflect their capacity for enrolling new 
students in the light of their levels of funding and supply of teachers. Specific quotas 
are calculated and published annually by each university prior to the Gaokao. 
However, the twist of the quota policy lies in its geographical discrimination and local 
protectionism. The quota represents the total number of new places available each 
year in a university, and in theory these places are open to all students. However, in 
practice, individual institutions set up specific quotas for each province. For example, 
a university in Jiangsu province fixes a quota of 100 new places in Computer 
Sciences for applicants from Jiangsu while only allocating 20 places to applicants 
from its neighbouring province, Anhui. The tendency to favour local candidates and 
screen outsiders by manipulating the quota policy has significant impact on 
geographical stratification.  
       China offers an interesting case where the state has played an important role in 
the expansion and the development of higher education while, at the same time, being 
responsible through its decentralised governance for the uneven geographical 
development. It provides a unique opportunity for examining the extent to which the 
state, the national examination system and decentralised admission and recruitment 
policies have affected students’ opportunities to get access to higher education and to 
different types of universities, particularly in relation to their geographical origins. 
   
5. Methods and data  
To investigate the impact of differentiated admission and quota policies on 
geographical inequality, I will present below evidence in the form of the distribution 
of universities across provinces, the geographical differences in progression rates to 
higher education, geographical variations in cut-off points and the quota arrangements 
in elite universities. This study draws on the data sets at the national and provincial 
level. The National Statistics Bureau of China publishes the China Statistical 
Yearbook every year, which provides the official documentation on education at both 
the schooling and university level. The China Statistical Yearbooks provide specific 
data on student enrolments and graduation rates of senior secondary schooling by 
each province and recruitment to higher education at the national and provincial level 
in selected years. In addition to the China Statistical Yearbooks, there are data on the 
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number and distribution of higher education institutions available from the dataset of 
the Ministry of Education.  
       Data on cut-off points and quotas are not available from a national source, but 
can be found for each province in selected years from various datasets of provincial 
ministries of education and online datasets including the Sunshine Project of the 
Gaokao, and the Sina Education Database, which will be specified when the details 
are introduced. To assess the impact of decentralised admission and recruitment 
policies in the broader context of higher education expansion and the world-class 
university, I will present over-time data for the selected years of 1996, 1999, 2005 and 
2009 to draw a coherent parallel with the time when key policy changes including the 
binggui and the world-class project were implemented. Peking University will be 
used as a specific case study to illustrate the effects of access to a world-class 
university. It is one of only two universities which are solely funded by the state’s 
elite project. Peking University is located in the capital city, Beijing, in the eastern 
part of China. Hence, the elite status and the geographical location of this university 
provides an interesting case for examining access to elite university by students from 
different geographical origins. 
       The main method used in this study will be a simple quantitative analysis using 
descriptive time-series national and provincial data on higher education. The rationale 
for choosing this method deserves some explanation. First, the empirical objective of 
this study is to illustrate the picture of geographical differences in the admission and 
quota policies in higher education rather than estimate the possibilities or chances of 
students from different regions in access to higher education. Therefore, the simple 
statistical method is used instead of, for instance, the logistic regression analysis 
employed in other studies - for example, Hannum and Wang (2006) - to predict the 
possibilities of education attainment by geographical origin. Second, this study aims 
to cover all provinces and municipalities, then highlight the differences between the 
three regions in the recruitment and quotas. Therefore, the statistical analysis will 
process detailed information on a total of 31 variables (provinces) and calculate the 
differences between the national and provincial data, for example, by the subtraction 
of the provincial secondary graduation rates from that of national rates in Table 3 and 
by the subtraction of the cut-off points and the quotas at the provincial level from that 
of the national ones in Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6. This simple statistical method 
will demonstrate a picture of geographical differences in access to higher education 
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across all the provinces, thus allowing us to understand the geographical divide in the 
opportunity structure. The discussion below considers each indicator in detail. 
 
 6.  Decentralised admission and recruitment into higher education and the 
geographical inequality  
Table 2 shows the distribution across provinces of higher education institutions, 
including elite and key universities. The elite universities are those included in the 
world-class project in 1998 while the key universities are the ones secondary in status 
and funding to the elite universities. The key universities were the product of the 211 
project proposed in 1995, which aimed at improving the quality of higher education in 
China
9
. There is a distinction between the elite and key universities, with the former 
one as the 985 universities and the latter ones as the 211 institutions. It can be seen 
that the majority of elite universities were concentrated in Beijing, Shanghai and other 
Eastern provinces. In 2011, 25 per cent of all elite universities were located in Beijing 
and another 13 per cent in Shanghai. By contrast, the western region accounted for 
only 15 per cent of the elite universities. There were no elite universities in western 
provinces like Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Tibet. 
The distribution of key universities was similarly skewed. Beijing accounted for 
nearly a quarter and the eastern provinces together for 80 per cent. As far as the total 
number of higher education institutions is concerned, more than 77 per cent were in 
the eastern region. Key areas in western China, such as Chongqing, Sichuan and 
Shaanxi only account for 7 per cent of total number of higher education institutions. 
In terms of the distribution of all types of institution, three provinces in the eastern 
region, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Shaanxi, in the western region, each had 
more institutions than all other provinces, except Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing.  
 
Table 2: The distribution of HEIs and types of universities across provinces 
 
Provinces/cities 
Number of elite 
universities 
Number of key 
universities 
Number of all 
types of HEIs 
Eastern Beijing  10 29 58 
 
Shanghai  5 12 31 
 
Tianjin  2 4 19 
 
Liaoning  2 4 44 
 
Shandong  2 5 51 
 
Jiangsu  2 11 46 
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Guangdong  2 4 39 
 
Hebei  1 2 36 
 
Zhejiang  1 1 33 
 
Fujian 1 2 23 
 
Guangxi 0 1 21 
 
Hainan  0 1 5 
Central Hunan  3 3 31 
 
Hubei  2 7 38 
 
Heilongjiang  1 4 31 
 
Jilin  1 3 28 
 
Anhui  1 3 33 
 
Jiangxi  0 1 24 
 
Inner Mongolia  0 1 12 
 
Shanxi  0 1 19 
 
Henan  0 1 38 
Western Shaanxi  3 7 40 
 
Sichuan  2 5 32 
 
Chongqing  1 3 15 
 
Gansu  1 1 14 
 
Xinjiang 0 2 11 
 
Yunnan  0 1 20 
 
Guizhou  0 1 17 
 
Ningxia 0 1 5 
 
Qinghai 0 1 3 
 
Tibet  0 1 3 
National Total 43 123 820 
Source: The list of higher education institutions with four-year undergraduate 
programmes (Ministry of Education, 2011).   
 
       Table 3 provides details of quasi-progression rates from senior secondary 
schooling to higher education for different provinces in 1996, 1999, 2005 and 2009. 
Due to lack of national data on students’ geographical origins, progression rates are 
estimated on the basis of the data from each province on senior secondary graduation 
and university entrance. The progression ratio is calculated as new entrants to higher 
education divided by senior secondary graduates. This, of course, does not provide an 
exact basis for comparison across regions because not all senior secondary graduates 
going to university do so in their own region
10
. However, it was suggested that 86 per 
cent of university candidates chose to go to an institution in their home province in 
Wu and Zhang’s study on students’ choices in higher education (Wu and Zhang, 
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2010). Therefore, I use quasi-progression rates in this article to capture an estimated 
transition from schooling to universities across all the provinces.  
       Table 3 provides the national average progression rates, and then subtracts the 
provincial rates from the national one, which allows a comparison of geographical 
differences. The table shows that access to higher education increased dramatically 
across all provinces from 1996 to 2009. Between 1996 and 2005 the national 
progression rate increased from 34 per cent to 76 per cent. However, the eastern 
provinces recruited significantly more students to higher education than the western 
provinces. Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin from the eastern region had higher 
recruitment than the rest of the provinces. This pattern was correlated to the higher 
number of institutions that were located in these areas. Several eastern provinces, 
such as Jiangsu, Hebei, Shandong and Guangdong, had consistently higher rates of 
access to higher education, when compared to the rest of eastern provinces. Sichuan 
and Shaanxi were the only western provinces that had relatively high levels of higher 
education participation.  
 
Table 3: Quasi-progression rates of senior secondary school graduates to higher 
education* in 1996, 1999, 2005 and 2009  
 Provinces/cities 1996 1999 2005 2009 
 National rates 0.34 0.59 0.76 0.78 
Eastern Beijing  0.96 1.34 1.41 1.5 
 Shanghai  0.47 0.59 0.53 1.26 
 Tianjin  0.46 0.55 1.05 0.9 
 Liaoning  0.16 0.23 0.23 0.18 
 Jiangsu  0.02 0.06 0.09 0.06 
 Fujian 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 
 Guangdong  -0.03 -0.07 0.06 -0.01 
 Hebei  -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 -0.08 
 Zhejiang  -0.08 -0.12 0 0.1 
 Guangxi -0.08 -0.15 -0.16 -0.07 
 Hainan  -0.08 -0.22 0.04 0.12 
 Shandong  -0.1 -0.24 -0.06 0.01 
Central Jilin  0.15 0.24 0.21 0.14 
 Heilongjiang  0.06 0.16 0.24 0.2 
 Hubei  0.04 0.03 0.06 0.05 
 Shanxi  -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.12 
 Henan  -0.04 -0.08 -0.24 -0.17 
 Jiangxi  -0.05 -0.09 0.11 0.08 
 Hunan  -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 Anhui  -0.09 -0.13 -0.1 -0.18 
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 Inner Mongolia  -0.17 -0.28 -0.24 -0.19 
Western Shaanxi  0.08 0.17 0.04 0.03 
 Sichuan  0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 
 Tibet  0 0.1 0.23 -0.1 
 Yunnan  -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09 
 Guizhou  -0.09 0.01 -0.18 -0.2 
 Gansu  -0.09 -0.16 -0.24 -0.21 
 Xinjiang -0.13 -0.22 -0.22 -0.29 
 Ningxia -0.17 -0.33 -0.36 -0.27 
 Qinghai -0.2 -0.36 -0.3 -0.41 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC 1996, 1999, 2001, 2006, 2010) 
Notes: 
1. Data are not available in China for the proportion of senior secondary 
graduates in each province who progress to university. However, data are 
available on the number of senior secondary graduates and new entrants to 
higher education in each province. As a best approximation to actual 
provincial higher education progression rates this table presents quasi 
progression rates which are calculated by dividing the number of new higher 
education entrants in each province by the number of senior secondary school 
graduates in the same province. These quasi progression rates are 
benchmarked against the actual national progression rates for particular 
periods by subtracting the national rate from the provincial rate. Positive 
values show quasi provincial rates above the national rate; negative values 
represent provincial rates below the national rate. For example, the quasi 
progression rate for Beijing in 1996 was 1.3. It was above 1 (100%) because 
of the high number of senior secondary graduates from outside Beijing 
attending universities in the city. The benchmarked quasi progression rate of 
0.96 is calculated by subtracting then national rate for that year (0.34) from the 
Beijing rate of 1.3.  
2. Data for each region were arranged by progression rates in descending order.  
3. * Higher education institutions are equivalent to the ISCED4, 5 and 6. 
        
      The previous section demonstrated geographical inequality in progression rates 
from secondary schooling to higher education, with comparatively more advantages 
for students from the eastern coastal areas. However, half of the provinces in the 
eastern region, including Guangdong, Guangxi, Hebei, Zhejiang, Hainan and 
Shandong, seem to have relatively lower progression rates than the rest of the region, 
based on the quasi progression rate values. This is probably due to the large number 
of senior secondary graduates who leave their provinces to study elsewhere (which is 
not captured by the quasi rate). Loyalka’s research provides a snapshot of student 
mobility in access to higher education institutions with four-year bachelor degrees in 
2006 and shows that the outflow rates then were 41 per cent, 44.2 per cent and 91.1 
per cent, respectively, for Guangxi, Hebei and Hainan, compared to the national 
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outflow rate of 35.1 per cent
11
 in 2006 (Loyalka, 2009: 62). However, this still does 
not explain the relatively lower progression rates in Shandong and Zhejiang where the 
availability of institutions was relatively abundant. Although only based on anecdotal 
evidence, another explanation, at least for Zhejiang, may be that in this highly 
industrialised and affluent province there are many entrepreneurial opportunities 
available which encourage young people to make early transitions to the labour 
market rather than go to university. Sichuan and Shaanxi appeared to perform better 
than other western provinces. This may be due to relatively large numbers of 
universities to population in these two areas (see table 2). Another factor in the case 
of Sichuan may be Chongqing’s status as one of the four municipal cities and the 
impact of this on the level of governmental investment in higher education in the 
province of Sichuan. Further research may shed more light on particular regional 
factors which help to explain variations in quasi progression rates, but a full picture 
will not be possible until provincial data are available on actual progression rates.  
       Table 4 will further illustrate the geographical differences in the admission 
processes to higher education, by giving the cut-off points for entry to elite and key 
universities in different provinces. The rationale for choosing the thresholds for the 
elite and key universities is that these universities recruit students at the national level 
when compared to those provincial institutions which predominantly enrol students 
from the home provinces (Tam and Jiang, 2015). In the national Gaokao, there are 
three main fields including: 1) social sciences, arts and humanities; 2) natural 
sciences, engineering and medicine and 3) music and sports studies. As discussed 
earlier, cut-off points are established differently for different types of universities and 
fields of study. They also vary from one province to another. Table 4 presents detailed 
entry criteria for elite universities in different provinces in 1999, 2005 and 2009. The 
cut-off points are only provided for two broad fields of studies, including social 
sciences and natural sciences
12
. The first row of the table shows the national average 
of cut-off points for different regions in different years. The rows below show how 
the cut-off points for each region vary from the average. By subtracting the provincial 
cut-off points from the national ones, we can see the differences between the regions. 
The provinces with negative numbers had thresholds for entry to elite universities 
which were lower than the national average.  By contrast, provinces with positive 
numbers had thresholds which were above the national average. Within each region 
provinces are arranged in descending order by cut-off points.  
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Table 4: Geographical difference in access to key and elite universities measured by 
cut-off points across provinces in 1999, 2005 and 2009 
   Social sciences     Natural Sciences  
   1999 2005 2009 1999 2005 2009 
 National 513 536 526 501 526 510 
Eastern Shandong  - 36 70 - 71 76 
 Liaoning  32 - 34 24 - 10 
 Zhejiang  19 32 - 39 24 - 
 Hebei  16 0 13 45 25 59 
 Jiangsu  15 24 - 45 3 - 
 Shanghai * -16 -56 -55 -16 -57 -55 
 Tianjin  -17 -38 -15 -13 -68 -8 
 Beijing  -47 -50 6 -41 -56 -9 
Central Hunan  43 38 28 36 18 24 
 Shanxi  32 -2 22 34 6 37 
 Hubei  31 -30 -8 65 -2 30 
 Heilongjiang  31 -30 -8 65 -2 30 
 Jiangxi  29 18 -11 41 19 8 
 Jilin  5 23 4 24 36 29 
 Anhui  4 7 17 32 15 69 
 Inner 
Mongolia  
-17 -11 -29 -2 29 -9 
Western Sichuan  12 34 14 50 72 -12 
 Chongqing  9 13 20 7 22 47 
 Guizhou  1 20 6 -21 10 -33 
 Gansu  -30 -1 -10 -14 32 11 
 Xinjiang -33 -20 -27 -501 -19 -30 
 Ningxia -33 -24 - -29 -22 -42 
 Yunnan  -38 -1 -6 -61 13 -10 
 Qinghai -38 -94 -83 -81 -96 -110 
 Tibet  - -41 -76 - -226 -250 
Source: The Sunshine Project for the Gaokao (2011); the People’s Daily (2000); Sina 
Education (2011). Other sources include provincial ministries of education’ 
announcements on the cutting-off points of the Gaokao annually. 
Notes:  
1. Data for each region were arranged in descending order by cut-off points. 
2. No relevant data were available for Hainan and Guangdong in the eastern region. 
3. *Shanghai and Guangdong pioneered in implementing the local Gaokao, different 
tests from the national Gaokao. Beijing, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Tianjin introduced 
their local Gaokaos since 2003. The data on Shanghai still permit a quasi comparison 
given the total points which are the same as inthe national Gaokao. 
3. Data on several provinces including Fujian, Guangxi, Henan and Shaanxi, are 
missing; therefore, these provinces are not included in the table. 
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       It is not surprising that the selection thresholds were much lower in undeveloped 
western provinces, including Tibet, Yunnan, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang than the 
national level, given the relatively poorer attainment at the schooling level and low 
representation of higher education institutions presented in the previous section.  
However, it is clear from the table that cut-off points were much lower in developed 
cities such as Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. It seems that cut-off points tended to 
favour students from their home provinces or cities. Students from municipal cities 
such as Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, appeared to benefit from the geographical 
distribution of key and elite institutions. Access to elite opportunities was most 
challenging for students from some eastern and central provinces, such as Shandong, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Hunan, Hubei and Heilongjiang. Entry requirements in eastern and 
central provinces were generally higher than in western provinces; however, access to 
elite opportunities had become more difficult in western provinces such as Qinghai, 
Yunnan, Ningxia and Xinjiang.        
       Table 5 and Table 6 use the case of Peking University to illustrate the 
geographical differences in the cut-off points and the quota policy. Table 5 provides a 
set of data which is concerned with de facto cut-off points for natural and social 
sciences for students coming from different provinces in 1999, 2005 and 2009. The 
table shows the average entry points to natural and social sciences in Peking 
University in selected years. Average entry points for applicants from different 
provinces are then compared to the overall average. By subtracting the provincial 
points from the national ones, we can see geographical differences in access to elite 
opportunities
13
. The higher a province ranks in the de facto cut-off points, the more 
difficult it was for students to get access to Peking University. It is shown again that 
the average Gaokao scores of entrants to Peking University from Beijing were 
consistently lower than those from other provinces except some western provinces, 
such as Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia. Students from the municipal city Beijing 
were advantaged in the severe competition in access to the elite university like 
Peking.  
 
 
 
Table 5: De Facto Cut-off points for different provinces in entry to Peking University 
in 1999, 2005 and 2009 
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   Natural Sciences   Social Sciences   
   1999 2005 2009 1999 2005 2009 
 National 564.5 636.1 621.1 601.3 659.9 657.1 
Eastern Liaoning  29.5 1.9 20.9 24.7 -21.9 15.9 
 Hebei  25.5 -16.1 -12.1 28.7 -13.9 19.9 
 Zhejiang  22.5 13.9 65.9 44.7 9.1 28.9 
 Fujian 12.5 -6.1 32.9 30.7 -14.9 14.9 
 Beijing  -24.5 -28.1 14.9 -29.3 -75.9 -4.1 
 Tianjin  -23.5 -27.1 9.9 8.7 -36.9 4.9 
Central Shanxi  31.5 -23.1 -14.1 -6.3 -22.9 0.9 
 Heilongjiang  30.5 23.9 13.9 31.7 22.1 21.9 
 Hubei  27.5 -27.1 -18.1 34.7 -4.9 11.9 
 Jilin  25.5 25.9 -0.1 -11.3 17.1 14.9 
 Hunan  24.5 21.9 0.9 14.7 -11.9 -7.1 
 Anhui  18.5 -15.1 -2.1 2.7 -5.9 26.9 
 Inner Mongolia  -3.5 2.9 -19.1 -59.3 6.1 -5.1 
Western Yunnan  16.5 26.9 29.9 -10.3 17.1 15.9 
 Chongqing  16.5 13.9 25.9 27.7 -2.9 20.9 
 Sichuan  14.5 13.9 8.9 10.7 38.1 -20.1 
 Xinjiang 7.5 14.9 -12.1 6.7 25.1 -16.1 
 Guizhou  -5.5 5.9 9.9 -2.3 10.1 -19.1 
 Qinghai -12.5 -19.1 -46.1 8.7 -0.9 -54.1 
 Gansu  -18.5 -0.1 -13.1 -11.3 9.1 -12.1 
 Ningxia -26.5 -10.1 -16.1 4.7 -6.9 -27.1 
 Tibet  -138.5 -34.1 -93.1 -75.3 -10.9 -80.1 
 
Source: The Forum of the Recruitment to Peking University (2011). The calculation is 
also based on the Guide of the Choices of Higher Education Institutions, which is 
published annually in each province. 
Notes: 1. Data for each region were arranged by cut-off points in descending order. 
2. Some data for Guangdong, Shandong, Shanghai, Guangxi, Hainan, Henan, Jiangxi, 
and Shaanxi are missing; therefore, these provinces are not included. 
 
       Table 6 further links the geographical variation in access to Peking University to 
the quota policy. As discussed previously, cut-off points were decided at the 
provincial level. The quotas, on the other hand, were decided by individual 
institutions as part of the recruitment planning. Table 6 provides the quota details in 
social and natural sciences in access to Peking University assigned to each provinces 
and municipal cities in 2005 and 2009. The higher the quota set for applicants from a 
particular province, the greater the chance for applicants meeting the minimum entry 
level to be accepted by the university. The table shows that there had been a decline 
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of total quotas in 2009 compared to that in 2005. The majority of the provinces 
provided lower quotas for access to Peking University in 2009 than in 2005. 
However, there were two cases of a substantial increase in the quotas allocated to 
students from Beijing and Shanghai. The quota increased by 50 per cent to students 
whose geographical origin was Beijing. Students from some eastern and central 
region, for example, Zhejiang, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Anhui and Jilin, were most 
disadvantaged in the competition to Peking University since the quotas allocated to 
most of central provinces halved between 2005 and 2009. The quota for enrolment to 
Peking University also decreased during the same period for students from the 
provinces with large minority populations including Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Guizhou, Yunnan and Ningxia. There was an increase of 2 and 1 quota respectively 
for students from Qinghai and Tibet in 2009. However, given the fact that these 
western provinces were provided with lower quotas, for example, five in Tibet and 18 
in Qinghai, access to Peking University for Tibetan and Qinghai candidates could be 
very difficult and more competitive than was the case for the local candidates from 
Beijing.  
 
Table 6: De Facto quota for different provinces in entry to Peking University in 2005 
and 2009 
  Quota 2009 Quota 2005 
 National Total 1,519 2,202 
Eastern Beijing  272 182 
  Shandong  91 106 
  Shanghai  65 58 
  Tianjin  63 79 
  Fujian 58 79 
  Guangdong  51 146 
  Zhejiang  31 109 
  Liaoning  45 196 
  Hebei  33 77 
  Guangxi 20 45 
  Hainan  21 20 
Central Henan  81 117 
  Hubei  68 98 
  Hunan  60 79 
  Heilongjiang  51 105 
  Shanxi  43 73 
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  Anhui  38 63 
  Jiangxi  38 26 
  Jilin  37 82 
  Inner Mongolia  29 42 
Western Chongqing  63 91 
  Shaanxi  52 69 
  Sichuan  47 75 
  Xinjiang 38 31 
  Gansu  31 39 
  Guizhou  27 32 
  Yunnan  26 41 
  Qinghai 18 16 
  Ningxia 17 22 
  Tibet  5 4 
Source: The Forum of the Recruitment to Peking University (2011). The calculation is 
also based on the Guide of the Choices of Higher Education Institutions, which is 
published annually in each province. 
 
7. Discussion 
Evidence presented in the preceding sections highlights the geographical inequalities 
in access to higher education in China which are the product of decentralisation in the 
admission and recruitment process. Contributing to this inequality are the uneven 
geographical distribution of universities, regional variation in cut-off points for 
university entry, and the quotas for entrants from different regions established by each 
university. The highly uneven distribution of higher education institutions had direct 
implications on access to higher education for students from different geographical 
origins. The elite and key universities recruited students nationally, but favour 
applicants from their own provinces. Other universities mostly recruit from the local 
area. Since elite universities are concentrated in the eastern provinces, and since their 
quota system is biased towards local candidates, high school graduates in the eastern 
provinces have a higher chance of gaining access to elite institutions than their peers 
in other regions. Candidates from western provinces have comparatively much less 
opportunity to be enrolled in elite universities than those from eastern provinces. They 
also have a lower chance of entry to non-elite universities since they have 
significantly fewer universities in their area. Candidates from Beijing, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Jiangsu and Shaanxi had much greater advantages in access to higher 
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education generally due to the higher number of higher education institutions in the 
province.     
       The inequality of access to higher education between eastern, central and western 
provinces is also demonstrated by the data on quasi-progression rates from senior 
secondary schools to higher education. Although progression rates increased 
significantly across all provinces between 1999 and 2009, the divide between eastern 
and western provinces remained. The dramatic increase in progression rates across all 
provinces resulted partly from the binggui policy which introduced fees for study in 
higher education. This incentivised universities to provide more student places. 
Research on the USA, South Korea and Japan, also shows a link between the charging 
of fees and increasing participation
14
 (Shavit et al., 2007). However, this increase in 
participation was not accompanied by greater geographical equality in access.  
       Geographical inequality in access to higher education was partly an effect of new 
decentralised policies on the admission and recruitment. Differentiated cut-off points 
and the quota policy had undermined the Gaokao as a meritocratic selection system. 
The Gaokao unified students from different geographical origins under the same 
examination system. However, the differentiated admission criteria and allocation of 
quotas for candidates from different provinces contradicted the Gaokao as a national 
selection system. The uneven academic attainment amongst candidates from different 
provinces had been the key rationale for differentiated cut-off points and the quota 
policy. Lower academic attainment among students from western provinces was 
related to the poor supply of teachers, infrastructures and other educational resources 
in these regions. However, the state’s decentralisation policy which allowed regional 
differentiation in cut-off points had been operated in such a way as to strengthen 
advantages of developed areas rather than to guarantee educational opportunities for 
the western provinces.  
       Geographical disparity was also demonstrated in access to elite universities. The 
regions set different cut off points not according to an absolute standard but rather 
based on the region’s distribution of scores in the Gaokao and the number of students 
who would be allowed access to university places at different tiers.  Cut-off points for 
elite universities in western provinces, such as Chongqing, Yunnan and Xinjiang, 
increased over time, suggesting that average performance in the Gaokao was 
improving. Moreover, since the majority of elite universities were based in the eastern 
region and the cut-off points had been rising for candidates from the western area, it 
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had become more difficult for students from these provinces to be accepted to elite 
universities. Candidates from developed cities, such as Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, 
had the most advantages in the competition for elite opportunities given the much 
lower entry requirements while access to elite opportunities was most selective and 
difficult for students from central provinces such as Hunan, Hubei, Heilongjiang and 
Jilin. It seems that central provinces were most disadvantaged in the meritocratic 
selection. The recruitment to Peking University illustrated how privileges for students 
from developed eastern areas had been doubly strengthened by differentiated cut-off 
points and the quota policy.  These decentralised policies protected the local students 
from the severe competitions in the Gaokao. The policy of differentiated quotas for 
students from different regions was used by the universities to favour the local 
candidates.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This article has investigated the causes of geographical inequality in access to higher 
education in China. In particular, it examines how political and institutional 
arrangements in relation to the admission and recruitment process have exacerbated 
geographical inequalities in access to elite universities. Several important findings 
arise from the analysis of the data. First, evidence on increasing participation by 
different birth cohorts since 1978 suggests that the state has played the key role in 
expanding higher education opportunities. The state’s ambition of economic 
development and national competitiveness had prompted drastic reforms in higher 
education, most importantly, initially, with the replacement of political criteria, such 
as the Communist Party membership and loyalty to the Regime during the 
Communist era, for access to higher education with the more meritocratic Gaokao 
based selection system during the market reform. The reforms highlighted the role of 
the state in expanding educational opportunities to promote the skills and attitudes 
appropriate for development and to garner support for the state. Second, the evidence 
on increasing recruitment of undergraduates and the narrowing gap across provinces 
in the cut-off points for entry to higher education suggests an improved academic 
performance of students from the western area. Evidence on the quota policy and the 
differentiated admission criteria across provinces suggests that the state’s policy of 
decentralisation - with devolution of admission and recruitment powers to the local 
and institutional levels - increased geographical stratification.  
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        At the theoretical level, the evidence from the study supports the geo-political 
argument on the interplay between spatial differentiation, economic development, 
political arrangements and geographical mobility. Geographical stratification was 
enhanced through systematic institutional and political arrangements, firstly in the 
economic restructuring during China’s transition to a market economy, then in the 
opportunity structures such as access to higher education. The state played an 
essential role in the uneven economic development of different regions. Moreover, the 
decentralized governance allowed the eastern provinces to increase the advantages of 
their people in accessing higher education. The same institutional structures punished 
the students from the poor western and central region who were relatively 
disadvantaged in their opportunities in achieving upward social mobility through 
higher education. Geographical advantages of eastern regions were legitimatized 
through the decentralised policy measures, thus increasing geographical stratification.  
       At the contextual level, several points arise from the geographical inequality in 
access to higher education in contemporary China. Decentralised governance 
introduced in higher education led to the differentiated cut-off points and the quota 
policy that undermined meritocracy and exacerbated geographical inequality in the 
opportunity structures. In effect, the state’s economic aims of accumulating human 
capital for nation-building through the meritocratic expansion of higher education 
were compromised by the growing power of the eastern political elites supporting 
preferential access to higher education for their local populations. The developed 
areas were the real winners from the quota policy. Hence, I argue that decentralisation 
policies in higher education, whilst consistent with the state’s economic development 
objectives, have resulted in intensified regional inequality in access to higher 
education and the social mobility this offers.   
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 The fourth municipal city is Chongqing, which is located in the western province of 
Sichuan. 
2
 The ‘shock therapy’ is a term coined by Jeffrey Sachs. It refers to a rapid market 
reform transition compared to a gradual reform for the post-Communist societies. For 
example, Poland experienced a ‘500 days’ of the shock therapy, including extensive 
privatization of state assets, price liberation and the removal of the state control and 
planning in 1990 (IMF, 2014: 11). 
3
 Fees exemption has been limited in selected higher education institutions, including 
some military colleges and institutions which are specialised in education, forestry, 
fishing and agriculture. Tuition fees for different universities are detailed in “The 
Standards for Fee-charging in Different Institutions” (China Education Online, 2010). 
4 
The binggui policy was a substantial reform in the recruitment, fee-charging, and job 
assignment in higher education in China. By 1997, the binggui policy was 
implemented in the majority of higher education institutions, which is detailed in 
Achievements of Reforming Higher Education in the Past 30 Years (Ministry of 
Education, 2008). 
5 
The idea of promoting the status and reputation of Chinese universities worldwide 
was first proposed in the 211 project in 1995. The 985 project was another product of 
the government’s ambition to play a leading role in the knowledge economy and in 
scientific and technological innovation. 
6
 The progression rate refers to the percentage of students population progressed from 
one level to the next. For example, the progression rate from primary to junior 
secondary level means the percentage of the students graduated from primary 
education to be enrolled in the secondary. 
7  
The Gaokao candidates come from three main categories including 1) natural 
sciences, engineering and medicine; 2) arts, humanities and social sciences, and 3) 
music and sports studies. For the candidates from first two fields, math, Chinese and a 
foreign language are compulsory examinations while math exam is optional for the 
candidates in music and sports studies. The selection criteria are based on a 
combination of the points from the selected subjects. This article focuses on selection 
criteria for first two broad fields.  
8
 This article focuses on cutting-off points from the national Gaokaos for the 
comparison purpose.  
9
 This project aimed at developing around 100 key higher education institutions with 
excellent research centers, and key fields of study; and these institutions are labeled as 
211 universities. The overall funding for the 211 project was around 18.6 billion from 
1996 to 2000 and a further 18.7 billion was provided from 2001 to 2005 (Ministry of 
Education 2001). 
10
 In some provinces which draw many students from outside, there is therefore an 
over-estimation of the actual progression rate. This is why the progression rates for 
Beijing (1996, 1999, 2005, 2009), Tianjin (1999, 2005, 2009) and Shanghai (1995, 
2005, 2009) come out as more than 1.00 (100 %) in Table 3. 
11
 Loyalka’s research focused on higher education institutions with four-year bachelor 
degrees. Therefore, he estimated the national outflow rate in 2006 was 35. 1. Wu and 
Zhang (2010)’s study took into consideration of all types of higher education 
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institutions, equivalent to the ISCED4, 5 and 6. They estimated the outflow rate was 
less than 14 per cent (Wu and Zhang, 2010).  
12
 Cut-off points are published to distinguish the vertical structure of higher education 
systems and the horizontal division between fields of study. For the former vertical 
structure, cut-off points are provided for non-degree institutions, general degree 
universities and elite/key universities. For the latter horizontal fields, two criteria of 
cut-off points are published for two broad fields of study, namely, the social and 
nature sciences respectively. Each field of study then indicates itself as either natural 
or social science category in the College Choice and Option forms.  
13
 The data for each region are arranged in descending order of average entry points. 
14
 Shavit et al.’ study primarily focused on East Asian societies and Western industrial 
countries. Therefore, the results on the expansion of higher education and the impact 
on increasing participation might not be extended to other developing contexts.  
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